How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing:
The Lessons of City of Chicago v ProLogis
RichardA. Epsteint
This Article examines the appropriate level of constitutional protection against
outside governments that condemn property located within a given local municipality
that uses tax increment financing (TIF) to fund local improvements The standard TIF
arrangement does not provide the TIF lenders with liens against any particularasset,
because to do so would be to abandon the tax-exempt status of the municipalbonds that
are issued. Yet these agreements guaranteethat the local government that issued the bonds
will take no steps to compromise their repayment from (incremental) tax dollars.These
protections allow TIF bonds to trade in ordinaryfinancialmarkets. The bonds may, however, prove vulnerable to loss when the private and public propertywithin the local municipal district is condemned by an outside government, as happened in City of Chicago v
ProLogis, where the Illinois Supreme Court denied the bondholders claim. I believe that
these TIF bonds should have been treated as property under the Takings Clause and not
as a mere "expectation" devoid of constitutionalprotection. This topic opens the way for a
larger considerationof how to value divided interests in real property under the Takings
Clause as a matter of modern finance theory in light of the powerful public choice issues
that lurk in the background of this, and allother,takings disputes

I. THE LOGIC OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING

In most municipalities today, the revenues to fund local governments are largely raised from real estate taxes.' Most commonly, these
taxes are keyed to the value of the taxed property. These taxes are
levied without respect to the income or wealth of the property owner,
and are used to discharge the general expenses of the community. The
competition between nearby localities imposes an important constraint on both the form and the amount of the taxes levied. The exit
option is more credible with local governments than with either states
or nations. Regardless, there is little doubt that real estate taxes will
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continue to serve as the dominant source of local taxation revenues.
But not the only source. One limitation of general real estate taxes is
that they preclude extensive localized investment in infrastructure
that will provide a unique benefit to some fraction of the municipal
tax district. At this juncture, the use of general real estate revenues
draws resistance from those property owners who do not lie within
that district. In the long run, no system of local taxation is politically
stable if some significant fraction of property owners systematically
pays more in taxes than they receive in benefits.
The most common device to respond to this challenge of differential local needs is the special assessment of old,' which has morphed
into the more flexible tax increment financing (TIF) of today. The creation of TIF districts within local communities allows a local government to impose additional taxes on some properties within a particular district without burdening other property owners who do not benefit from the expenditures within that district. Properly constructed,
these taxes could create infrastructure improvements to landowners
within the narrow TIF district that justify the increment over normal
real estate tax rates. The program can gain added legitimacy if it must
be approved only by a supermajority of real estate owners within that
district. Essentially, the two-tier system of taxation seeks to match
benefits with burdens, albeit at different levels, in both the entire
community and the TIF district.
There is an extensive literature that debates the desirability of
creating TIF districts, which are now authorized in forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia.' Many commentators fear that TIFs will
be used to spark eminent domain projects for essentially private purposes.' Others think that TIFs can siphon off resources that are better
devoted to schools and other community projects.! Still others think
that TIFs impose rigid restrictions on the effective use of local funds.
And still others could raise large-scale objections to the tax-exempt
status of TIF bonds.
This Article shall not address any of these issues, but shall assume
that these devices form an appropriate part of the local government
toolkit, only to ask the instrumental question of how they best work.
On this score, it is evident that most TIF districts require extensive
3 See generally Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation:
Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J Legal Stud 201 (1983).
4 See Briffault, 77 U Chi L Rev at 72-74 (cited in note 1).
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front-end expenditures that need third-party financing. TIF financing
can only work by making sure that the private lenders who fund these
projects will be repaid. But how? One possibility is to grant the lenders a direct lien on the public properties created with TIF money. But
unfortunately, lenders cannot foreclose on public improvements that
have no value in private hands. Nor is it possible to impose liens on
the many private properties that benefit from TIF dollars. Not only is
foreclosure still an issue, but, worse, this alternative founders because
any revenue derived from secured obligations is not entitled to the tax
exemption that is generally available for municipal bonds. Making TIF
repayment a general obligation of the local government also fails. The
whole point of TIF financing is to remove the additional cost from the
community at large and to place it on the group of local property
owners who derive the direct benefit from it.
To avoid these clear perils of public and private collateral, the
common practice is to secure TIF bonds out of additional real estate
tax revenues that can be raised from the local landowners whose
property has increased in value from the expenditure on public improvements.7 To make this work, the TIF bonds adopt a form of nonrecourse financing. The local government is not liable to repay these
bonds from its general revenues. The lenders can look only to the additional tax revenues on the real estate within the TIF district. The
local government collects the added revenues through its tax system,
and then places them into a segregated fund for the benefit of the TIF
bondholders. If that government refuses to collect, segregate, or turn
over the money, the TIEF bondholders could obtain an order requiring it
to discharge its obligations. In practice, the underlying arrangements are
so clear that local governments do not default on their key service obligations. Embedding the TIF bond in the real estate tax has the added advantage of conferring on TIF bondholders the same priority that all real
estate taxes have over private liens held by lenders and materialmen. To
make sure there is no hanky-panky, the local government warrants that it
will pay the fair market value for the bonds in the event that it condemns
the private property that is used to secure the payments. In addition, it is
common for these governments to covenant that they will not make zoning changes that reduce the value of the property within the TIF zones.
Given these constraints, TIF bonds trade in orderly markets whereby
their value is determined by two key components: fluctuation in general
7 See Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping
Centers, Tax Increment Finance: Best Practices Reference Guide 34 (2007), online at
http://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/CDFA.pdf (visited Oct 22,2009).
8 See James J. Kelly, Jr,Bringing Clarity to Title Clearing: Tax Foreclosure and Due Process
in the Internet Age, 77 U Cin L Rev 63,73 (2008).
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interest rates and changes in the value of the security. The former variable can move in any direction at any time. But as the riskiness of the
local improvements falls, the TIF bonds increase in value. Typically,
therefore, TIEF bonds have a stable legal framework that calls little attention to itself. The less said about it the better.
It is here that the plot thickens. Even if the local issuer of TIF
bonds can take no steps to undermine their worth, other government
entities are not subject to the same constraints because they have not
made the same contractual undertakings. In particular, the local government that issued the TIF bonds is not the only entity that can exercise the power of condemnation in any given community. State and
federal agencies can condemn land, both private and public, for their
projects, and states can authorize other municipal governments to
condemn land outside their own territories for projects deemed to
have regional or national importance.! These federal, state, and local
condemners have not entered into any agreements to pay the fair
market value of the TIF bonds upon condemnation, and the question
arises both as a matter of statutory and common law whether they are
required to make the bondholders whole when they condemn the private property that is used to secure the TIF financing.
II. UPSETrING TIF FINANCING: CITY OF CHICAGO V PROLOGIS
This question is now up for consideration in the Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of City of Chicago v ProLogis.oThe case arose in

connection with some $7 million in TIF bonds issued in 1996 by the
Village of Bensenville, pursuant to the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act." Bensenville is located near O'Hare Airport. Its
public improvements created the infrastructure that allowed the private landowners in a rundown portion of Bensenville to develop a
high-class air cargo distribution center to serve the freight traffic in
and out of O'Hare. The bonds in question were for a twenty-year term
and carried an interest rate of 10 percent per annum." Both the public
and private parts of the overall project were successfully completed,
But see Mayor of Baltimore v Baltimore Football Club, Inc, 624 F Supp 278,284 (D Md

9

1985) (refusing to allow a city to exercise this authority over an entity in another state).
10 890 NE2d 639 (Ill App 2008), affd, 2010 WL 200015 (Ill).
11 See Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-4(a) (West):
A municipality may ... [b]y ordinance ... approve redevelopment plans and redevelopment

projects, and designate redevelopment project areas .... No redevelopment project area shall
be designated unless a plan and project are approved prior to the designation of such area and
such area shall include only those contiguous parcels of real property and improvements
thereon substantially benefited by the proposed redevelopment project improvements.
12 ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 642.
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so that the bonds traded at a premium before the City of Chicago
condemned the entire project area, both public and private, to build
an extension of O'Hare Airport in April 2006." At the time of condemnation, the bondholders had received in interest payments of over
$2.3 million in cash on their bonds, which were then trading at a premium over face value. In its condemnation papers, the city included
compensation for all the real property located in the district, but made
no allocation for the TIF bondholders. As is customary, these TIF
bonds contained a covenant that indicated the limited sources of income available for the repayment of the bonds:
The Bonds, together with the interest * * * if any, thereon, are limited obligations of the Village, payable solely and only from the
Pledged Taxes. * * * No holder of any Bond shall have the right
to compel the exercise of any taxing power of the Village for
payment of principal thereof or interest * * * if any, thereon.
THE BONDS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN INDEBTEDNESS
OF THE VILLAGE OR A LOAN OF CREDIT THEREOF
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ANY STATUTORY OR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION."
The question raised by this provision is simple to state but difficult to
answer. Does the obligation to repay the TIF bonds survive the condemnation of the real estate to which the tax liens attached? In dealing
with this question, both the Illinois Appellate Court and the Supreme
Court sided with the City of Chicago by taking the view that the tax
liens in question died when the property to which they were attached
was transferred into public hands." Since everyone agreed that these
bonds were never general obligations of the Village of Bensenville, any
source of repayment was gone. The city claimed that the risk of loss on
these bonds had to be borne by the bondholders and not by the City of
Chicago." One critical irony in this case was that 60 percent of the TIF
bonds had been issued to the original developers of the real estate within the TIF district, who well understood the synergies between the public and private improvements." The remainder went to ProLogis, which
at the time of the condemnation was also the landlord to the new private buildings on the site, all of which were leased out to paying te-

13 See Virginia Groark, Bensenville Offers O'Hare-Fight Help, Chi Trib M3 (Feb 7,2006).
14 ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 642 (recognizing that the bonds were "considered investments,

subject to known risk").
15 Id at 647-48; 2010 WL 200015 at *5.
16 ProLogis, 800 NE2d at 642; 2010 WL 200015 at *4-5.
17 ProLogis, 800 NE2d at 641-42.

126

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:121

nants. 8 Subsequently, ProLogis took an assignment of the developer's
interest so that it owned all the property that was the source of the TIF
repayments." There was a perfect concordance between the owners of
the real property and the holders of the bonds.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois
Appellate Court, which denied ProLogis's claim for compensation for
the now worthless bonds." The claims in question rested on the Takings Clauses of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions
and the intermediate appellate court's ingenious arguments used to
deflect important questions that relate to the nature of property and
the proper scope of the state's eminent domain authority. In general, I
think that its decision is wrong as a matter of first principle and that
the errors it made call into question some of the basics of property
theory and takings law alike. I shall examine these two points in order.
A. Property, Guarantees, and Expectations in a World of Nonrecourse
Debt
The core of the city's argument that the Appellate Court accepted runs as follows:
Here, the contractual terms and the explicit language of the bonds
provided that repayment was to be exclusively from incremental
taxes, if any. As the City points out, the bondholders had no legitimate expectation of guaranteed repayment; in fact, as the language
of the bonds makes clear, the bondholders do not have the right to
compel the Village to exercise its taxing power to pay the bonds."
Finally, it insisted that any harm to the TIF bondholders was noncompensable consequential damages and not direct losses from government
actions.2 The quoted passage is literally correct insofar as the entire
power of TIF bonds is to insulate the general revenues of the Village
from the claims of the bondholders. But otherwise the statement reveals
18 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant ProLogis and Intervenors-Appellants, City
of Chicago v ProLogis, No 1-07-0108, *8-9 (Ill App filed June 15, 2007) (available on Westlaw at
2007 WL 6848393) ("ProLogis Brief") (noting that by April 1996, over $2 million had been paid
on the bonds to bondholders).
19 ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 641-42 (noting that just under $9 million of the redevelopment
cost was available for TIF).
20
ProLogis, 2010 WL 200015, *1.
21
ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 647-48. This issue was not pursued in the Illinois Supreme Court,
which contented itself with the observation that the sophisticated investors in the bonds had
assumed the risk of default, ProLogis, 2010 WL 200015 at *3,6, without asking which risks were
assumed and which not. The more detailed analysis in the text addresses the issues of great public significance that the Illinois Supreme Court passed over.
22 ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 644-45.
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major intellectual confusion about its three central terms -"legitimate
expectations," "guaranteed repayment," and "if any."
Start with the words "guaranteed repayment." ProLogis's claim
does not require that that payment be guaranteed against any and all
contingencies. The simple analogy here is to the standard nonrecourse
mortgage, which arises whenever the debtor pledges specific assets to
the repayment of a claim, to the exclusion of all other wealth. Creditors who accept this sort of financing typically obtain additional protection by two other means, either alone or in combination. First, they
could demand a larger value cushion than they would require from a
well-heeled debtor who signed a recourse mortgage-that is, one that
allows the creditor to get a deficiency judgment against the borrower.
Second, they could demand a higher interest rate to offset the risk.
These nonrecourse arrangements are not limited to property transactions. They are implicit whenever corporations with limited liability
borrow money from creditors who do not obtain guarantees from
their shareholders. Here, in addition to the two protections just mentioned, creditors can insist on covenants that prevent the distribution
of dividends or other payments to shareholders that could diminish
the pool of wealth available to repay the loan.
The use of these nonrecourse arrangements is what marks the
TIF bonds as distinctive financial instruments. It is for just that reason
that the words "if any" were included in the bond covenants, to make
it clear that if these funds failed, no money would be owing. The words
were not added in order to excuse Bensenville from paying off those
obligations when money from the designated sources was available.
The two phrases in question point to a complex distribution of the
residual risks of nonpayment, which makes it wholly inappropriate to
write as though we live in a dichotomous universe in which repayment
is either guaranteed or not guaranteed. The true situation is that there is
a guarantee that all payments from the designated source be turned
over to the creditor. There is no guarantee that additional monies be
brought to the table, even if it is always open to the borrower to use
outside revenues to forestall the foreclosure of the lien if it so desires.
These nonrecourse instruments in any and all contexts provide rights to
creditors and borrowers alike. It is a simple error to assume that the
lender on a nonrecourse obligation trusts only to the good will of the
borrower for repayment.
The first error in the Appellate Court's decision is only compounded by its incautious and inexact use of the phrase "legitimate
expectations" in connection with these nonrecourse payments. These
two words are fraught with difficulty, which can only be disentangled
by dealing with two distinct but related situations. The first of these is
the set of expectations between the two parties to the transaction. The
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second is the relationship that the two parties have to any third person
whose actions disrupt or undermine their private relationship in question. In ProLogis,these two facets of the question arose in a constitutional context. But the only way to get purchase on the issue is to understand how these notions of legitimate expectations play out in the
private law. Takings law is parasitic upon the ordinary institutions of
private property. As I have long argued, the entire field degenerates
into ad hoc favoritism unless there is some external standard against
which to judge the actions of government officials." To be sure, these
officials can take property in circumstances where private parties
would be enjoined. But subject to that enduring difference, a solid
signpost of private decisions is to ask this question: if the actions of
the government were undertaken by a private party, would it have
been subject to an obligation to compensate? If not, then the government is in the same position, as with its actions to enjoin traditional
nuisances under the police power. It need not pay compensation. If
yes, then the converse holds and compensation is now required, even
if the private party is not allowed (when the taking is for public use, as
is surely the case here) to ignore the government action. It follows,
therefore, that we have to look first at the role of legitimate expectations as between the two parties to any relationship and thereafter
turn to its role in cases when third persons become involved.
This inquiry is only needlessly complicated by the collateral point
that these damages should not be allowed because they are only "consequential." The initial point is that they do not fall within the traditional categories of consequential damages, which cover such matters
as relocation expenses, which are costs borne by the property owner
that do not result in a gain to the property owner. Here there is an
extinction of the set of rights in the very property that the government
is taking. And even if these were consequential damages, why in principle should they not be recoverable when they amount to real losses
from government actions that should be taken into account in order to
prevent those excessive condemnations where the loss to private par-

23 For an account of its use and misuse, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council- A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan L Rev 1369, 1379-85 (1993). See also Richard A.

Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Council, 26 Loy LA L Rev 955,962-63 (1993) (using public and private law to illustrate the difference
between a loss of value attributable to competition and a loss of value attributable to a taking).
24

See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-

nent Domain 36 (Harvard 1985) (posing a straightforward test to determine whether there is a
taking: "Would the government action be treated as a taking of private property if it had been
performed by some private party?") (italics in original, thankfully).
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ties exceeds the gain to the state?2 Tort defendants who convert property can be held to pay consequential damages-why not the state?
B.

Two-Party Relationships

In this area of the law, the distinction between (protected) property interests and (subjective) expectations occupies an enduring
role.2 The cases at the poles show why this distinction is so necessary.
At one pole, a person is in possession of land in fee simple. In an
everyday sense, we might say that this person has an expectation that
the state will use its force to protect his exclusive possession of that
property against strangers that might take it away from him. But the
term "expectation" in this sense refers to the sound conviction that the
owner's right to demand the state's cooperation in defending his
property interest will, as expected, occur. Here the peculiar blend of
normative and predictive elements lies behind the expectation, which
is far more than a subjective hope or aspiration.27 That type of expectation does not only apply to parties who are in possession of the fee
simple, but also to persons who have more limited interests in land.
The holder of a reversion over a lease has a property interest in land,
which he expects the state to enforce in accordance with its terms
both during the lease and at its expiration. Likewise, as regards our
earlier discussion, a mortgagee has a lien over the land, which she also
expects the state to enforce both during the pendency of the mortgage
and at its expiration. The language of legitimate expectations works in
sequence. The interest is valid on substantive grounds, which justifies
calling expectations about its enforcement legitimate. Let the expectation of enforcement be shattered, and the lack of public confidence
will lead to the disintegration of the system.
See id at 51-56.
See, for example, John R. Cooke, Dames & Moore v. Regan-Rights in Conflict: The
Fifth Amendment Held Hostage, 31 Am U L Rev 345, 351-54 (1982) (noting that the lack of a
formula to determine when compensation is due for public takings has led to such cases being
resolved through ad hoc, fact-specific inquiry).
27
For an interesting Roman law parallel on the relationship between an emptio spei and
an emptio rei speratae,see Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, and Alan Watson, eds, 2 The Digest
of Justinian 18.1.8.1 at 515 (Pennsylvania 1985) ("Sometimes, indeed, there is held to be a sale
even without a thing as where what is bought is, as it were, a chance."). Literally translated, the
former means the purchase of an expectation and the latter means the purchase of the thing
expected. But the former was not just hot air. The distinction was set in the context of a fisherman seeking a catch. The emptio spei meant that the net had to be cast, but the risk of coming up
empty fell on the buyer. The emptio rei speratae meant a purchase of the expected thing, such
that the buyer had only to pay for the catch that was realized. The difference was not between
right and no right. It was over the allocation of risk over events that had to take place, given the
seller's obligation to cast the nets. We have modem equivalents as well. In horseracing, the stud
fee can be higher if the seller bears the risk it will not take and lower if that risk is on the buyer.
25
26
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The second sense of the term "legitimate expectation" is at sharp
variance with the first. A person could have a legitimate expectation
that some property will come his way even though he has no entitlement to it. One obvious example of this type of unenforceable expectation is the interest that a named beneficiary under a will has in the
property of a living person. I may draft a will that leaves my property
in equal parts to my three children, and all of them may well expect
that in the ordinary course they will receive that property at my death.
But everyone understands that I may revoke or alter the will at any
time. Thus, if I change my mind in the interim, the persons named as
future beneficiaries have no enforceable claim to the property after
my death. To be sure, their expectations may have been legitimate in
the sense that it is rational for them to "count on" my leaving the will
unchanged during my life. In addition, these beneficiaries can engage
with any buyer or lender on the strength that this expectation will be
met. But given the delineation of the legal entitlements, all these
transactions are undertaken subject to the explicit risk that neither the
named beneficiaries nor their creditors have any claim against the
estate if the will is correctly changed. Indeed, this power to revoke can
easily be retained over a trust fund from which the income has already
been distributed on a timely basis to the named beneficiaries, whose
future claims are precarious, even if they had received prior distributions from the trust. 8 It is for these reasons that we can talk about the
sale or mortgage of an expectation when there is no vested interest. The
price in question will reflect the risk of cancellation, which may well increase if the fact of sale or mortgage is known to the testator during life.
This second sense of expectation has an important role to play in
public law contexts. To see why, we need only put the state in the shoes
of a grantor (it cannot be a testator) who has reserved the explicit
right to revoke a grant that has been made at will. Like any private
grantor, the state can revoke for any reason and not pay damages for
its action. 9 That simple point was the outcome of the decision in United States v FulleriThere, the government under the provisions of the
Taylor Grazing Act leased certain lands at below-market rates.'] The
28 See generally, for example, Fischer v Union Trust Co, 101 NW 852 (Mich 1904) (holding
that gratuitous payments on mortgages for benefit of the plaintiff generated no obligation to continue payments). See also Pitts v McGraw-Edison Co, 329 F2d 412,416 (6th Cir 1964) (holding that
gratuitous retirement benefits paid to plaintiff generated no obligation to continue such payments).
29 I put aside here all the complications arising out of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions used to control certain exercises of state monopoly power. See Richard A. Epstein,
Bargaining with the State 226-27 (Princeton 1993).
30 409 US 488 (1973).

31 Id at 491-92. See Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat 1269, 1271 (1934), codified at 43 USC § 315
et seq. For discussion of its operation, see Public Lands Council v Babbitt, 529 US 728, 731-39
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statute under which these permits were granted said explicitly that
they did not "create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the
lands."" The genius of then-Justice William Rehnquist's opinion was
that it took the statute at its word, even though the statutory permits
were only given to individuals whose property lay near the government lands. The stable expectation that the government would not
exercise its condemnation rights led in all private land sales to an increase in the value of the land to which those grazing rights were appurtenant. Nonetheless, when the United States decided to condemn
Fuller's property, it first canceled the grazing rights, thereby depriving
him of that extra increment of value, and its decision was upheld by a
divided Court."
That decision is correct, for it would be a mistake to instruct, as
the district court did, that the permits could be taken into account in
setting value by considering their "availability" to the permitee. There
is, in these two-party situations, no reason to blur the line between
rights and expectations of continued use by fudging the various valuation questions. If, therefore, the TIF bondholders in ProLogis had only
this type of expectation, they should go home empty-handed. But that
would have happened only if the Village of Bensenville had withdrawn
the tax payments on its own motion under an agreement that was terminable at will. What happened, however, is that the security was lost
through the condemnation of a third party, the City of Chicago. To see
why this matters, we have to turn to the three-party situations.
C. Third-Party Interference with Expectations
The introduction of a third person always complicates the analysis. Starting with the private law, it is clear that the defendant party
either can tamper with a vested right between the plaintiff and a third
person, or can interfere with an expectation that the plaintiff has of
continued relationships with the third party. The two cases play out in
somewhat different fashion. Consider first the case where there are
strong contractual ties between the parties, as when the third person is
(2000). For an account of the cock-eyed subsidies built into the Act, see Michelle M. Campana,
Public Lands Grazing Fee Reform: Welfare Cowboys and Rolex Ranchers Wrangling with the

New West, 10 NYU Envir L J 403,4034) (2002) (decrying the below-market rates of interest).
32 43 USC § 315(b).
33 The conclusion of then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion read:
The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act ... make clear the congressional intent that no
compensable property might be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of the permit. Given that intent, it would be unusual, we think, for Congress to have
turned around and authorized compensation for the value added to fee lands by their potential use in connection with permit lands.
Fuller, 409 US at 494.
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the landlord of the plaintiff. Here, the usual tort of inducement of
breach of contract applies if the defendant, with knowledge of the
contract, persuades the third person to remove the plaintiff from the
property in order to lease or sell it to the defendant. Since Lumley v
Gye," the injured plaintiff has both an action against the third person
on the lease and an action against the defendant who induced the
breach. That situation did not arise here because there was no action
by Bensenville that constituted a breach of its agreement with ProLogis, but it is important to keep Lumley in mind because it has been
used to justify the proposition that the defendant's interference generates no obligation of compensation.
The more relevant line of cases deals with the interference of advantageous relationships. The hallmark of these cases is the deliberate
interference by either force or fraud with the ongoing relationship
between the plaintiff and the third party that has not been reduced to
an enforceable contract so that only an expectation of future dealing
is at stake." As a tort matter, the force case involves a situation where
the defendant shoots at a third party in order to induce him to steer
clear of the plaintiff. Likewise, the situation with fraud involves the
standard form of defamation in which the defendant knowingly lies to
the third party about the plaintiff in order to dissuade that party from
entering into or continuing any relationships with the plaintiff.
For these purposes, there is no need to examine the extent to
which this interference tort rests on either negligence or strict liability
because the public condemnation by the City of Chicago was deliberate. With these deliberate interferences, the action contains no requirement that the third person breach its relationship with the plaintiff.' What matters in these circumstances is the nature of the underlying expectations. Since we are in the three-party context, the correct
procedure can no longer argue that since the third party is entitled to
withdraw from the relationship at will, it should be treated, for the
benefit of the defendant, as if it had zero probabilityof continuation.
That procedure is surely incorrect because it ignores the gains
from continuation of that relationship to both the third person and the
plaintiff in the ordinary course of events. What must be done, therefore,
is to assess the likelihood that the relationship would be either formed
or maintained in the absence of third-party force or fraud. This is no
118 Eng Rep 749 (QB 1853).
See, for example, Tarleton v M'Gawley, 170 Eng Rep 153, 154 (KB 1793) (finding that
shooting across the bow of boats to keep natives from trading is actionable when deliberate).
36
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979) ("One who intentionally and improper3
35

ly interferes with the performance of a contract ... between another and a third person ... is

subject to liability to the other.").
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different from giving tort victims actions for lost income from future
relationships. For newly formed relationships, that estimation procedure could prove uncertain, but in this case, we have no doubt whatsoever that the long history of compliance with the underlying deal
meant that Bensenville would continue to play by the rules as long as
the bonds were outstanding. So if there were a third person who blew
up the houses to which the bonds were attached, he could be held to
pay for the full value of the bonds.
To be sure, there is a wrinkle that will become indispensable for
the overall analysis, namely, that the party in question would not have
to pay twice for the same element in value. Thus, if the bonds were an
asset in the hands of ProLogis, they were also a liability on the property that serviced them. So full compensation for the bonds requires an
appropriate adjustment in the value owed to the property owner, to
reflect the lien on the asset. Stated otherwise, the total amount owed by
the defendant for the destruction of the real property to which the
bonds attached should be identical whether or not the bonds are in
place. If the bonds are in place, then less is paid for the loss of the real
property if the bondholders are compensated in full. If not, then that
value is paid to the landowners. The situation is but one application of
the Modigliani-Miller Theorem that the value of an asset is independent
of the capital structure superimposed on it." It is commonly stated that
this result holds only in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy, and informational asymmetries." In this peculiar context of condemnation ex post,
these assumptions fit quite well. It follows therefore that the existence of
the complex arrangement between Bensenville and ProLogis determines
who gets paid, not how much.
The notion of legitimate expectations carries with it different
weight in the three-party context. Just that result is found in the takings
cases on the same problem. The companion case to Fuller was Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States.39 In that situation,

the United States condemned land on which Almota had constructed a
37 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and
the Theory of the Firm, 48 Am Econ Rev 261, 268-69 (1958) (stating that the theorem is equivalent to the assertion that a dairy farmer cannot "earn more for the milk he produces by skimming some of the butter fat and selling it separately, even though butter fat per unit weight, sells for
more than whole milk"). The shorthand version of this, which appeared recently in the Wall Street
Journal, repeated a Yogi Berra joke of Merton Miller. "The pizza deliverer says to Yogi Berra:'Do
you want your pizza cut into quarters or eighths?' Yogi answers:'Cut it into eight pieces I'm feeling
hungry tonight."' Burton G. Malkiel, The Price Is (Usually) Right, Wall St J A13 (June 10, 2009)
(describing the debate between efficient-market theorists and behavioral economists).
38 See Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Is It
Chasing One's Tail?, 15 Am J Tax Pol 167,172-74 (1998).
39 409 US 470 (1973).
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grain elevator whose expected life was greater than the seven and onehalf years left on the current lease.40 Almota and its landlord had renewed leases on multiple occasions in the past, and there was every
expectation that it would do so in the future.
The question in the case was whether Almota could recover for
the value of the grain elevator attributable to the period after the expiration of the lease, which the Court allowed notwithstanding its general
(and mistaken) rule that it offers no compensation for the disruption of
ordinary commercial arrangements.41 The ground for distinction was
that Almota had already built the improvement in question.42 But the
answer should not turn on the existence of a physical asset. The reversionary interest in the grain elevator has value regardless of whether it
is owned by Almota or its landlord. The transaction costs are sufficiently low, and the pattern of dealing sufficiently clear, that we know that
absent the intervention, it would end up with Almota, who had the
higher use value. As with the general analysis above, the government
should pay the same amount either way, where the only question is how
the proceeds are divvied up between the parties. Given the forcible
disruption of their stable arrangement, that division of compensation
should take place on the footing of a lease renewal on customary
terms. Almota could keep the interest if it was paid or recover it from
the government if not.
The pattern of argument here is in fact reflected in the customary
terms found in many leases, whereby the lease is terminated between
the parties when condemnation is at issue.43 The efficiency advantage
of this simplification is that it reduces the net costs of transacting with
the government, as it is now possible to offer a valuation of the property as a whole without having to offer an evaluation of the divided
interests in it. That task could be difficult because it is often unclear
whether the tenant's leasehold estate is positive or negative in value,
which depends on whether the rental value of the property exceeds its
market value or the reverse. But working out those details is of no
concern for the government because if the lease is at a premium, then
it pays more to the tenant and less to the landlord. If it is not, the reverse is true. But once again the fundamental result is that the total

40
41
42
43

Id at 471.

Id at 476 & n 3.
Id at 476.
For a discussion, see Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill, and Daniel Unumb, Bar-

gaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards

between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L Rev 1083, 1087 (1987) (showing how the allocation of
condemnation awards can be determined by the lease).
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amount paid is equal to the value of the underlying property when put
to its best use, regardless of who owns what interest in it.'
These results cast a negative light on some of the constitutional
cases relied on by both the Illinois Supreme and Appellate Courts.
First among these is Omnia Commercial Co v United States," which

arose out of the following situation: The plaintiff had entered into a
contract to purchase the entire year's output of steel from the Allegheny Steel Company at a price that was below its current market value.4 The government then condemned the steel while in the hands of
the seller,4 agreeing to pay only the amount that the seller would have
received had the deal gone through. The question was whether the
government was obliged to compensate the plaintiff for the lost profits on the steel.0 Justice George Sutherland answered in the negative
on the ground that what was taken was the subject matter of the contract and not the contract itself." In effect, that horrific decision announces that whenever there is a divided interest in property (here
held subject to sale), the government gets to acquire it for the lower of
cost or market. The result arises because the government receives a
free option. Accordingly, if the price goes down, the government waits
for the steel to be delivered and buys it at its lower market price. If
however, the price goes up, the government takes the steel at the contract price and leaves the buyer high and dry. But there is no reason to
deviate from the rule that requires payment of the fair market value of
the steel regardless of contract terms. The parties can divide the proceeds
so that the seller gets the sale price and the buyer the gain. Under the
Court's logic, once the government pays the seller the contract price, it is
uncertain whether the seller will be exposed to a breach of damage suit,
which reduces his total compensation, or whether the buyer forfeits his
profit. But the basic theorem of takings law should govern the case. If a
private party who takes the steel must answer for its market value in the
face of divided ownership, so too must the government.
In the actual litigation, ProLogis distinguished Omnia on the
ground that it involved a contract that was fully executory while ProLogis had fully performed its deal. The point is true, and the argument offers
a convenient handhold for a state court that does not want to do battle

44
Indeed, by this principle, Bensenville should be able to recover for the value of its public
improvements, whether or not funded by the TIF bonds.
45
261 US 502 (1923), quoted extensively in ProLogis, 890 NE2d at 645. For a fuller criticism of the case, see Epstein, Takings at 90-92 (cited in note 24).
46 Omnia, 261 US at 507.
47
Id.
48
Id at 507-08.
49
Id at 510-11.
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with an established, if erroneous, decision of the United States Supreme
Court, which neither the Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court was prepared to do. But the Prologis logic concedes too much to the exercise of
government power. In the law of contract, promises are enforceable
whether the contract is executed or not. All that differs is the measure of
damages. That said, the result in ProLogis is predetermined. Chicago
must pay for the full value of the property taken, regardless of the capital
structure superimposed on it. The enforceability of the bonds determines
only who collects, not how much is paid.
In response, it could be argued that there is no reason to distinguish this case from the customary situation with real estate taxes.
When the state takes real property for its own use, it need not compensate the city for the loss of its tax revenues.0 That result is in general correct, even though the city has a tax lien in its own right for unpaid taxes. The key point here is that ordinary real estate taxation is
used to fund current expenditures. The taking of the property by the
government thus has two effects. It reduces the revenue to the local
government, and it also decreases the expenses that it has to incur, and
the two are a wash. This need not always be the case, for the state government (like private charities) may be tax exempt even if it continues
to receive the same services as before. That vexing situation could not
have arisen in ProLogis,however, because the covenants between the
bondholders and Bensenville prohibited the village from rezoning the
property for tax-exempt use, which is consistent with the paramount
effort of both parties to the transaction to secure the tax base needed
for repayment of the TIF bonds. In some instances, the covenants
would be of no effect, as when the federal government takes the land.
Yet even here, there is good reason to think that real property in general should not receive tax-exempt status given the additional burdens
it would throw on everyone else." That larger question has to wait for
another day, even if it is presumptively troubling to grant a tax exemption for parties who receive current administrative services. But even
if that inequity is not corrected, the situation with TIF bonds is different. There the taking occurs as in other taxation contexts, but in this
situation neither the local government nor real estate owner is relieved
of any service obligation that it would otherwise incur. So the conclusion continues to hold. The City of Chicago may quarrel over who gets
the value of the bonds, not whether that value should be included.
5o

See, for example, Public Water Supply District No 3 v United States, 135 F Supp 887,890

(Ct Cl 1955) ("While ... ownership of tangible property is not always essential to the establishment
of a taking under the Fifth Amendment, the interest must be more than a mere right to tax.").
51 See the discussion of United States v Aho and United States v Florea in text accompany-

ing notes 62-63.
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This basic approach helps explain the second Supreme Court case
on which both the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts reliedMullen Benevolent Corp v United States.2 In Mullen, the local im-

provement district funded improvements by issuing bonds, secured by
assessments of the local real property, which were supposed to be sufficient to pay them off in full." In this instance, the United States acquired the properties and contributed to a fund equal to the amount
needed to pay the assessments that had already been imposed on the
land.'4 But after the bonds were acquired, a shortfall in the tax revenues
was discovered, and the government resisted any fresh assessment on its
properties to make up its share of the shortfall." Justice Owen Roberts
sustained the government's refusal to pay on the authority of Omnia,
holding that the bonds were not taken: "By purchase of the lands the
United States at most frustrated action by the city to replenish the assessment fund to which alone the bondholder must look for payment of
his bonds. But this was not a taking of the bondholder's property."" The
point seems wrong when the supposed act of "frustration" is the conscious taking of the underlying property interest. If a private party took
the land, he would have to compensate both the holder of the equity and
the mortgagee to the extent of their respective interests. The same logic
should apply here.
In any event, Mullen supports ProLogis because the government
conceded that it had to make good on all unpaid assessments prior to
the takeover. The government only resisted the new assessment by asserting in effect the defense of sovereign immunity against the payments. But that result runs against the grain in eminent domain cases.
The most famous maxim in modern eminent domain law comes from
the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v United States," which held
that the overarching purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."4
At the most general level this decision is inconsistent with the
overall approach in Mullen. Although the point is not explicit, it appears that the government continues to enjoy the benefit of the local
improvements, as did its predecessor in title. Why force other lan290 US 89 (1933), discussed in ProLogis, 690 NE2d at 645-46.
290 US at 90.
5
Id at 91.
55
Id at 91-92.
56
Id at 94-95.
5
364 US 40 (1960).
ss Id at 48-49 (holding that compensation was required for liens on uncompleted boat
hulls that were taken for use of the US Navy).
52
53
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downers to bear what should be a public cost? More strikingly,
Armstrong involves the same problem raised in Mullen but in a different guise. There, the claimants were materialmen in the State of Maine
who placed a lien on a United States vessel on which they had done
work in Maine's territorial waters." The lien was nonrecourse, much like
the obligation in ProLogis, and the government sought to defeat its
foreclosure by sailing the vessel out of state waters so that the lien was
effectively dissolved." It would be perfectly easy to say that this was not
a taking of the lien, but simply a way to "frustrate" its collection. But
the point makes no sense, for why should these materialmen have to eat
the cost of improvements whose benefits are shared equally by all
American citizens? Just that result applies in Mullen, and it hardly
matters that the source of the immunity from collection is sovereign
immunity, not the physical removal of property from the jurisdiction.
That defense works uneasily, to be sure, against ordinary tort actions,
but it has never been held to apply to cases where property is taken
instead of destroyed by tort action. Mullen therefore is both distinguishable on the one hand and wrong on the other.
The weaknesses of that decision, moreover, are revealed by the
way in which it has been ignored in subsequent cases. Both United
States v Aho and United States v Florea6 3 involved patterns similar to
those in Mullen. In both these cases, drainage districts issued improvement bonds for the long-term maintenance of the drainage system that worked a benefit for each parcel contained within the region.6 The United States acquired several of these parcels through
condemnation and sought thereafter to rid itself of the obligation to
contribute its pro rata share for the upkeep of the district.6 Prior to
the condemnation there was a perfect matching of benefit and burden
across all parcels.6 The government's refusal to pay would necessarily
62

59

Id at 41.

60

Id at 41-42.

61 See, for example, Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co v United States, 260 US 125, 127 (1922)

(applying sovereign immunity and finding there was no taking because the damage done by the
government "might be a tort but which could be nothing else" if done by a private party).
62 68 F Supp 358, 366 (D Or 1945) (refusing to allow the government to take improved
property without accepting "the burden of the taxes specifically imposed by legislation to pay for
the benefit").
63 68 F Supp 367,375 (D Or 1945) (describing the right to receive annual assessments from
the improved property as a "property right").
64 See Florea, 68 F Supp at 367 (specifying an estimated improvement cost of $600,000,
leaving unpaid bonds in the amount of $238,000); Aho, 68 F Supp at 358-62.
65 Florea, 68 F Supp at 368; Aho, 68 F Supp at 359.
66 See Florea,68 F Supp at 369 ("[T]he benefit of the water received and the burden of the
payments were more nearly equalized."); Aho, 68 F Supp at 360 ("[Plarcels of land not benefited
cannot be subject to the burdens of contribution.").
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force other parcels to bear these maintenance costs while giving the
government a free ride., Judge James Fee took pains to distinguish
these assessments from the "unsecured levies of state, county and municipal taxes to liquidate general obligations of such bodies,"" and
held in effect that this was a special assessment for a unique return
benefit that the United States should pay.
His opinion thus makes a persuasive case that benefits and burdens should not be presumed equivalent on a priori grounds. But at no
point did he apply the same analysis to ordinary real estate taxes. To
be sure, many such expenditures will exhibit the rough proportionality
that makes this assumption justifiable on administrative grounds. But
it is easy to think of exceptions, especially for those portions of local
real estate taxes that provide public goods for the community at large.
Thus, let the federal government take over large swaths of a small
community, and it will do little, if anything, to reduce the costs that it
incurs in keeping open its courthouse, recording office, or power
plants, whose total costs of operation are relatively insensitive to total
population. In these cases, it perhaps would be wise to rethink the rule
that allows the condemnor to force the local community to bear its
losses. Indeed the Bensenville situation looks as though the remainder
of the town suffered when it was denied its general revenues from the
taxed property, which probably required fewer services than other
portions of the town. The basic logic of Armstrong applies to a wide
range of circumstances to which the narrower decision in Mullen does
not. Mullen should yield to Armstrong with its superior logic.
These precedents thus raise many complex issues. Yet in dealing with the problem, however, the Illinois Supreme Court ignored
every systematic distributional consequences of its decision. Instead it
contented itself with distinguishing both Aho and Flores on superficial
and inadequate grounds:
In the case before us, the only security the bondholders had was
the right to the incremental taxes, if any, which did not encumber
the subject property. The security for the bonds is outlined in the
bond ordinance and in the TIF bonds themselves. Additionally,
each bondholder signed the certificate of purchase and, in doing
so, confirmed they understood what secured the TIF bonds."

67

68

Florea, 68 F Supp at 369; Aho, 68 F Supp at 360.
Florea, 68 F Supp at 371 ("[T]he levying of assessments in a Drainage District . . . is a

property right which belongs to the aggregate of the owners within the boundaries."); Aho, 68 F
Supp at 359.
69
ProLogis, 2010 WL 200015 at *5.
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The argument is, however, wholly unresponsive. It ignores the
entire elaborate set of covenants and undertakings to say that the "only security of the bonders" lay in the incremental taxes, if any. The
whole point of these arrangements was to make sure that the Bensenville could not ride roughshod over the transaction. The unconventional nature of the lien was driven by a variety of tax and business
situations. Yet the implicit argument of the Illinois Supreme Court
was that Bensenville could terminate the arrangement at will, which
was manifestly not the case. It is therefore wholly indefensible to allow a third party to what Bensenville could not, and what Chicago
would never dare try with its own TIF bonds. At this point, the last
sentence only adds insult to injury. The bondholders knew precisely
what risks they took-diminished revenues from the project. It was
the Illinois Supreme Court that had no understanding of the complex
arrangements that secured the bonds.
CONCLUSION
Tax increment financing devices have been in common use for
many years now because they supply a sensible way in which local
governments can differentiate in the level of services provided to different parts of the same municipal governments. It is of course possible to oppose the use of these devices on the ground that they misallocate the resources of local governments. But whether that attack
succeeds or not, the one point that does seem clear is that once
created, TIFs should be protected from subversion by other government entities that have eminent domain power over the territory of
the local government that issued the TIF bonds. These local governments have taken every possible step to secure the bonds against their
own machinations. Their agreements, however, are powerless to protect these bonds from the machinations of other governments who
have not bound themselves by contract. The only protection for that
source of abuse is to insist that these outside governments be forced
to compensate these bondholders, either directly or indirectly, for the
loss of value inherent in the bonds.
The basic logic of this position follows from general finance
theory. The value of the real estate taken by the condemning government is independent of the capital structure imposed on it. All that is
needed to get the right result is to require that the condemnor engage
in consistent accounting. From a private law perspective, TIF bonds
are liens, and hence liabilities, on the private property within the district. They are assets in the hands of the bondholders. Accordingly,
there are only two consistent ways in which to do the accounting. One
is to follow the property interests by valuing each separately, which is
what the plaintiffs in ProLogis sought. The other approach is more
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adventurous, for it conscientiously ignores the capital structure, puts
the money in a common pot, and lets the various claimants sort out
their interests after the government leaves the scene. In this case, the
two methods are the same since ProLogis is the sole bondholder and
the sole owner of real estate. In other cases, the necessary allocation
among multiple claimants will have to be made more explicitly. But no
matter how we think about it, the one confident conclusion is that the
decisions of the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts are wrong for
the same reason that Omnia is wrong: They give a free option to the
interloper, the City of Chicago, which gets the best of both worlds. It
pays the property holders for the value of their property less the liens
on it but does not compensate the bondholders when it wipes out
their nonrecourse interest. The simple truth is that what counts as an
asset to the bondholders is a liability to the real estate holder. The city
cannot treat these complex instruments as though they are liabilities
to the real estate owners but not assets to the bondholders. As usual, if
the fundamentals of the transaction are well understood, the constitutional law will almost take care of itself. But if a court misunderstands
slippery terms like "sophisticated investors," "legitimate expectations"
and "guaranteed payments," it will surely go astray.
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